We show that the definition of neighbor in Markov random fields as defined by Besag (1974) when the joint distribution of the sites is not positive is not well-defined. In a random field with finite number of sites we study the conditions under which giving the value at extra sites will change the belief of an agent about one site. Also the conditions under which the information from some sites is equivalent to giving the value at all other sites is studied. These concepts provide an alternative to the concept of neighbor for general case where the positivity condition of the joint does not hold.
Introduction
This paper studies the conditional probabilities and the definition of neighbor in categorical random fields. These can be used to describe spatial processes e.g. in plant ecology. We start by the common definition of neighbor in Markov random fields and show that the definition is not well-defined when the joint distribution is not positive. Then we provide a framework to study the conditional probabilities given various amount of "information". For example, the conditional probability of one site given some others. Since the usual definition of neighbor is not well-defined when the "positivity" condition of the joint distribution does not hold, we introduce some new concepts of "uninformative set", "sufficient information set" and "minimal information set".
Suppose we have a finite random field consisting of n sites. The belief of an agent about one site can be summarized by a probability distribution and can be changed to a conditional distribution by relieving new information which can be the value at some other sites. We study when the new information changes the agent's belief and what is "sufficient" information for the agent in the sense that giving the information would be equivalent to giving the value of all other sites. We answer some interesting questions along the way. For example suppose agent 1 has less information than agent 2 regrading an event A and a new information is released. Now, suppose that agent 1 does not change his belief about A. One might conjecture that since agent 2 has more information, he as well will not change his belief after receiving the new information. We show this conjecture is wrong by counterexamples.
Neighbor in categorical random fields
Suppose (Ω, Σ, P ) is a probability space and
We use the shorthand notation:
Besag (1974) and Cressie and Subash (1992) , defined the neighbor as follows:
Definition 2.1 For site i, i = 1, · · · , n, site j = i is called a neighbor if and only if the functional form of the P (
Note that in the above definition, we need to make sure that the conditional probability is defined. The above conditional probability is defined on
We show in the following example this definition is not well-defined in general since the functional form is not unique.
Example 2.1 Let U 1 , · · · , U 4 denote a random sample from the uniform distribution that take only values 0 and 1 each with probability 1/2. Define:
where [ ] denotes the integer part of a real number. By the last equality in above, X 3 if we know the value of X 2 , the value of X 1 will not give us extra information. Hence, P (x 3 |x 2 , x 1 ) = P (x 3 |x 2 ).
wherever the conditional probability is defined. This shows the definition of neighbor is not well-defined in general.
Next we show that the positivity of the joint distribution implies that the definition of neighbor is well-defined. By positivity of the joint distribution, we mean
Lemma 2.1 Suppose X 1 , · · · , X n be a categorical random field. If the joint distribution is strictly positive then the concept of neighbor is well-defined for this field.
For some functions f, g. By positivity condition, the conditional probability is defined everywhere. Hence,
Suppose h ∈ H − J . Then x h does not appear on the left hand side so g is not dependent on x h . We conclude H − J = ∅. Similarly, J − H = ∅.
Uninformative information sets
In the following, we consider the general case (when the positivity condition does not hold) and define some useful concepts which are well-defined even though the concept of neighbor is not as well-defined as defined by Besag (1974) .
We start by some useful definitions and lemmas regarding conditional probabilities. Consider the conditional probability P (A|B) where A, B are two events and P (B) > 0. Also consider a third event C. It is interesting to study when C changes (or does not change) our beliefs about probability of A. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 3.1 We call C uninformative for A given B if
Let UN(A|B) to be the set of all events C such that P (B, C) = 0 or P (A|B, C) = P (A|B).
One might also conjecture that UN(A|B) is closed under intersection. We show by some counterexamples, this is not true.
Example 3.1 Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, A = {1, 2, 3, 4}, B = Ω, C 1 = {2, 4, 6, 8}, C 2 = {1, 3, 5, 8} and consider a uniform probability distribution on Ω.
Then P (A|B) = P (A) = 1/2, P (A|B, C 1 ) = P (A|B, C 2 ) = 1/2 hence C 1 , C 2 ∈ UN(A|B). But P (A|B, C 1 , C 2 ) = 0 while P (B, C 1 , C 2 ) = 1/8 = 0.
Example 3.2 Consider the joint distribution for (X, Y, Z) given in Table 1 , where every row has the same probability of 1/4. Suppose that two agents want to predict the value of X. The first person does not have any information and the second one knows that Z = 0. Now, assume that we provide extra information to both agents. The extra information is the value of Y . For the first agent at the beginning (before the information about Y was given): P (X = 0) = P (X = 1) = 1/2. After he knows the value of Y : P (X = 1|Y = 0) = P (X = 1|Y = 1) = 1/2. Hence, the extra information does not change the belief of the first agent about X. One might conjecture that since the second agent has more information than the first and the new information did not help the first agent update his belief, it should not change the belief of the second agent as well. This is not true! In fact after getting the extra information, we have the following inequality for the second agent: We to prove a seemingly trivial fact about the conditional probabilities in the following lemma.
In other words, P (B, C i ) does not depend on C i . Then C i ∈ UN(A|B):
Corollary 3.1 Suppose P (x i |x i 1 , · · · , x i I ) depends only on x j 1 , · · · , x j J , where
when the conditional probability, P (
Consider the sets
These sets are disjoint, there exist finitely many of them and their union is Ω. Then by the assumption P (A|B,
Sufficient and minimal information sets
This section introduces minimal and sufficient information sets. Suppose we have n sites in the random field indexed by 1, 2, · · · , n. We denote a site by i. Let i c = {1, 2, · · · , n} − {i} be the set of all other sites other than site i. Let I = {i 1 , · · · , i I } ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n} be a collection of sites and let
Note that D depends on the set of the subscripts and not the order of them. Also note that D is the domain where the conditional probability given the values on the sites I is defined. By p(i|I), we mean the conditional probability of site i given I defined on E i;I = M i × D I . Also note that with the positivity of the joints distributions assumption:
Since the concept of neighbor is not well-defined in the general case, we seek other useful definitions to study the general case.
Note that P (i|I) is a function
Definition 4.1 Sufficient information set: Suppose J ⊂ I ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n}, J is called a sufficient information set for i, given I, if
on E i;I . We denote the set of all such sets by SI(i, I).
Definition 4.2 I ⊂ 1, 2, · · · , n is called a minimal information set for i if P (i|I) = P (i|J ) for any J , J ⊂ I, J = I. We denote the set of all such sets by MI(i).
In the following, we study the properties of SI (sufficient information) and MI (minimal information) sets.
First, let us see what happens if i ∈ I. In this case, {i} ∈ SI(i, I). Also, note that in general {i} ∈ MI(i) if m i > 1. (If m i = 1 then we need no information to say what the value of site i is.) Also note that ∅ ∈ MI(i) in general.
One might conjecture a smaller a set than a given minimal information set is a minimal set as well. This is not true! In example 3, {Y, Z} ∈ MI(X) but {Y } is not minimal since P (X|Y ) = P (X|∅).
Proposition 4.1 Suppose J ∈ SI(i, I) and H = I − J . Also assume
whenever, the right hand side is defined.
, we want to show
whenever the left hand side is defined. But
since J is sufficient. Now use the fact that UN is closed under disjoint union and take the union over
Lemma 4.1 a) If J ∈ SI(i, I) and J ⊂ H ⊂ I then J ∈ SI(i, H). b) If J ∈ SI(i, I) and J ⊂ H ⊂ I then H ∈ SI(i, I).
We want to show that for a fixed (x
On the left hand side take the union over
To generalize the concept of neighbor, we can use the sufficient information and minimal information sets. We call a set efficiently sufficient for site i if it is minimal and sufficient for i given i c . i.e. I is efficiently sufficient for i if and only if I ∈ MI(i) ∩ SI(i, i c ). We denote the set of all such sets ES(i). If for some i, ES(i) has only one element, we call that element a neighbor of site i. Note that the definition of neighbor coincide with the definition of neighbor by Besag (1974) and Cressie and Subash (1992) if the positivity condition holds. In the following example we show that this is not necessary.
Example 4.1 Consider the joint distribution of X, Y as given by Table 2 , where every row is equally probable. Then the positivity condition does not hold since P (X = 1, Y = 0) = 0. But for X, the site Y is a neighbor since Y ∈ MI(X) ∩ SI(X, Y ). Also for Y, X is a neighbor. 
